Abstract
Introduction
Grid computing systems [FoK99, FoKOI] that have been the focus of much research activity in recent years provide a virtual framework for controlled sharing of resources across institutional boundaries. As part of such a geographically distributed environment, an entity will have the privilege of using pools of resources that would not be available to it otherwise. Unfortunately, the idea of having a virtual framework such aa the Grid is not appealing to some entities because of the risk of being associated with the notion of "sharing"resources or services. Because of the sensitivity and the vitality of data or information, such entities prefer to use their own "closed box" resources. This is not just costly for the individual entities but also an inefficient way to utilize resources.
To make Grid computing more appealing, trust must be addressed and trust domains must exist where an entity can use resources or deploy services safely. Trust is a complex Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical & Computer Engineering 0-7803-7514-9/02/$17.00 0 2002 E E E concept that bas been addressed at different levels by many researchers [MEOOI, AdF99, AbHOO, DaDOl] . We classify trust into two categories: identity trust and behavior m t . Identity bust is concerned with verifying the authenticity of an entity and determining the authorizations that the entity is entitiled to access and is based on techniques including encryption, data biding, digital signatures, authentication protocols, and access control methods. whereas behavior trust deals with a wider notion of an entity's 'bustworthiness," For example, a digitally signed certificate does not convey if the issuer is an industrial spy and a digitally signed code does not convey if the code is written by competent programmm [AbHOO] .
In this paper, we propose a trust model that deals with behaior trust, bow it is evolved based on transactions between entities, and how it is managed in Grid computing systems. In the rest of the paper, when we state "trust," we mean "behavior trust" unless explicitly stated Section 2 defines the notions of trust and reputation and outlines mechanisms for computing them. An overall trust model for Grid systems is presented in Section 3. The notion of trusted domains in a Grid environment is discussed in Section 4. An example of a trust transaction involving two domains and how the trust relationship is built and maintained is illustrated in Section 5. Related work is brietly discussed in Section 6.
h s t and Reputation

Definition of Trust and Reputation
The notion of trust is a complex subject relating to afum belief in attributes such as reliability, honesty, and competence of the trusted entity. There is a lack of consensus in the literature on the definition of trust and on what constitutes trust management wis96, GrSOO, AbHOO]. The definition of trust that we will use in this paper is as follows:
T m t is t h e j n n belief in the competence of an entity to act as expected such that thisfum belief is not a f i e d value associated with the entity but rather it is subject to the entity's behavior and a p plies only within a speclfic context at a given time.
That is, thefirm belief is a dynamic value and spans over a set of values ranging from very trustworthy to very untrustworthy. This trust lewl (TL) is built on past experiences and given for a specific context. For example, entity y might trust entity x to use its storage resources but not to execute programs using these resources. The TL is specified within a given time because the TL today between two entities is not necessarily the same TL a year ago.
When making trust-based decisions, entities can rely on others for information pertaining to a specific entity. For example, if entity z wants to make a decision of whether to use machine Mj, which is unknown to x, then 2 : can rely on the reputation of Mj. The definition of reputation that we will use in this paper is as follows:
The reptarion of an entily is an qectation of itr behavior bared on other entities'observatiom or informotion about the entily's post behavior within o specific contat of a giwn time.
Computing Trust and Reputation
In computing trust and reputation, several issues have to be considered First, trust decays with time. For example, if x trusts y at level p based on past experience five years ago, the trust level today is very likely to be lower unless they have interacted since then. Similar time-based decay also applies for reputation. Second, entities may form alliances and as a result would tend to trust their allies and business partners more than they would trust others. Finally, the trust level that z holds about y is based on z's direct relationship with a, as well as the reputation of y, i.e., the trust model should m p u t e the eventual trust based on a combination of direct trust and reputation and should be able to weigh the two components differently. t-tij,c) ), wherecis the specific context for the trust relationship, t is the current time, and tij is the time of the last update or the last hansaction between D; and D j . The time factort as explained earlier is very critical because infomation well-received from an entity five years ago might be ill-received today based on the validity of the infomation as well as how trustworthy is the entity today. The repntation of D j is computed as the average of the product of the mt l e d in the reputationtrust table (R'IT), the decayfinction (T(t -t y , e)), and the recommender trust factor (R(Dk, D , ) ) for all domains k. In practical systems, entities will use the same information to evaluate direct relationships and give recommendations, i.e., RTT and DTT will be the same. Because reputation is based primarily on what other domains say about a particular domain, we introduced the recommender trust factor R to prevent cheating via collusions among a group of domains. Hence, R is a value between 0 and l and will have a higher value if Dk and D, are unknown or have no prior relationship among each other and a lower value if DI, and D j are allies or business partners.
r ( D i , D j , t , c ) = a~Q ( D ; , D j , t , c ) f p x R ( D j , t , c )
Q ( D , , D j , t , C ) = D T T ( D ; , D , , c ) X T(t -t i j , c )
n ( D j , t , c ) = Figure 1 shows the overall trust model in which the Grid is divided into Grid domuins (GDs). We associate two virtual domains with each GD, namely a mource domain (RC) to signify the resources within the GD and a client domain (CD) to signify the clients within the GD. T~s t agents exist in each GD with mechanisms to: (a) update the GDs' rmst tables, (b) allow entities to join GDs and inherit their trust attributes, and (c) apply a decay function to reflect the decay of rmst between domains.
Trust Model
Overview
A seaigbt forward approach to creating and maintaining the trust level table can result in an inefficient process in a very large-scale system such as the Grid. This process is made efficient in our model by various methods. First, as mentioned previously, we divide the Grid system into GDs. The resources and clients within a GD inherit the parameters of the RD and CD that they are associated with. This increases the scalability of the overall approach. Second, trust is a slow varying attribute, therefore, the update overbead associated with the trust level table is not significant A value in the trust level table is modified by a new trust level value that is computed based on a significant amount of transactional data Third, by limiting the number of contexts, we can reduce the hgmentation of the trust management space. In our study, the contexts are limited to primary service types such as printing, storage, and computing.
Direct and Reputation Trust
To evaluate the trust relationship at a given time t be- two components have to be considered: (a) direct relationship (direct trust), and @) the reputation relationship (indirect trust based on recommendations). Each domain's hust agent will maintain a D I T as shown in Table 2 . From this table we see that for a specific context y, Dk can utilize r e s o u w or deploy services using Dj's resources and hence a direct relationship will exist between these two domains.
Since a direct trust relationship is asymmetric, each of these two domains involved in this direct relationship will have its own interpretation (see Table 1 ) of how well or how bad this direct trust relationship is. When D; wants to have an interaction with Dj, in addition to the direct trust relationship, D; can rely on recommendations from other domains about Dj (i.e., asking for the reputation of D!). Therefore, each domain's trust agent will evaluate the h as well as the recommender trust as illustrated in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. (tij,c) . In a similar M i o n Dj will form its TL(tji,c).
Evaluating Recommender Trust
When Di wants to have a transaction with Dj for a s p s cific context c at a given time t, Di can rely on recommendations from other domains regarding Dj' s trustworthiness pertaining to c Let us assume that Di receives a recommendation from Dk. D, can not evaluate Dk'S recommendation until Di directly interacts with D, within the same context for which the recommendation was made. After the direct trust relationship is evaluated and the resulted TL(t,j,c) is obtained, see Section 3.5, Di will he in a position to update the recommender trust factor (R) for its recommenders. and 1. If 6 > 0.5, more preference is given to TL resulting from the current direct trust relationship between the two domains. In a similar fashion, the RIT can be updated.
Required and Existing Trust Levels
Trust Inheritance
In such a distributed environment, entities can join or leave a domain Di at anytime. Hence, a trust model suitable for such an environment should have mechanisms for managing trust for such entities. Our trust model accommodates for this as follows. When an entity 2 joins a domain, it inherits the TLs in the domain' s DTT as well as in the domain's R'IT. However, the other domains might not trust z to he as trustworthy as another entity who bas been with Di for a longer period of time. Therefore, there is a member weight associated with every entity to indicate if the entity is a new, recent, or an old member with its domain and it is up to the individual domain to decide what constitutes an entity to fall in one of these member weighfs.
Evolving Trust
Our model allows domains to build up their TLs ffom scratch without any prior experience nor trusted recommenders. One might argue that as a newcomer, there is always the chance that a rogue domain may take advantage of the unwitting newcomer by pretending to offer "assistance" for malicious hidden motives. It is true that a newcomer is faced with a high degree of uncertainty about other dcmains. However, ow trust model is designed in such a way that newcomers are protected from such malicious motives. Let Di be a newcomer that wants to interact with 0 3 . Each of these two domains will have a RTL. So as a newcomer, Di can set its RTL value to F, which is no existing trust relationship has, and thus enhanced security is enforced to guard Di's resources or applications. As Di interacts with other domains, it can build its own trust values.
Trusted Domains
The integration of "trust" into network computing systems introduces trust awareness that enables total isolation of different resource pools as well as client pwls , -
I .
Classification Classification ranee desctintion (a) create more applications to services, and (b) can create new forms of service models. Furthermore, the efficiency of running these applications as well as the utilization of resources will improve due to the minimization of security overhead.
Trust 'kansaction Example
To illushate the use of our model, we provide an application example of evaluating direct as well as reputation hust relationship in the context of a "printing service" where Di is providing a "printing service'' to other domains. Let us assume that Di is a newcomer and hence its DTT as well as RTT are empty. Another domain Dj is looking for a "printing service" to print its annual report. Although both Di and Dj have "!rust" concerns, we focus on how Di evolves and builds its "trust" regarding this experience with Dj. A resource management ageoc as illustrated in Figure 1 , wntacts Di as a candidate RD since it provides the service sought. Having no direct trust relationship with D, and heing a newcomer, Di sets its RTL to F. Di also can rely on recommendations and say that it receives the two reammendations about D, as shown in Table 3 . Once the transaction hetween Di and Dj starts, Di evaluates the direct trust relationship with Dj (i.e., D, updates its DTT) by examining whether 0, abides by its RTL. Di does this evaluation by two mechanisms: (a) using an audit trail analysis [Lun93] to determine if D, is an abusive domain by detecting failed commands issued by Dj, and (b) monitoring sequences of system calls to detect an abnormal behavior of Dj [HoF98] . Assume that Di has a classification system to classify the behavior of other domains as shown in Table 4 . Furthermore, let us assume that Di indeed detects an abnormal behavior of Dj and assigns a trust value of three, corresponding to a TL of D. Having TL(tij, c) = 3, Di's DTT can be updated, as explained in Section 3.8. Initially DTT(Di,Dj, c) was 0 and assuming that the value of 6 is 1, the updated value in Di' s DTT will be: DTT(Di,Dj,c) = 6 x TL(ty,c). Therefore, Di is able to build its direct hust relationship from scratch (i.e., updateitsDTT)andthenewTLforDTT (D,,D,,c) KeyNote [Bla99] are concerned identity t m t . These trust mechanisms do not wnsider the behavior trust which changes over time and thus these approaches have no mecbanisms to monitor trust relationships. In addition, these trust models and trust management applications do not recognize the need for entities to leam *om past experiences in order to dynamically update their mwt levels [GrSOO].
A model for supporting behavior t m t based on experience and reputation is proposed in [AbHOO] . This trustbased model allows entities to decide which other entities are trustworthy and also allows entities to tune their understanding of another entity's recommendations.
A survey of trust in Internet applications is presented in [GTSOO] and as part of this work a policy specification language calledPonder [DaDOl] supporting behavior m a t was developed Ponder can be used to define authorization and security management policies. Ponder is being extended to allow for more abstract and potentially complex trust relationships between entities across organizational domains.
Our model expands the work done in [AbHOO, DaDOl] in many ways: (a) trust decays with time, (b) an entity may trust its allies and partners more than it trusts others, (c) our trust model uses a mechanism such that trust values r e sulting from direct relationships weigh more than those r e sulting from reputation of an entity, and (d) our trust model accommodates for inheritance.
[GrSOO] T. Grandison 
